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Abstract
Available research indicates that worry is an important process involved in the development and
maintenance of both psychological (e.g., Generalized Anxiety Disorder) and physical (e.g.,
coronary heart disease) problems. However, this process is still in need of further investigation,
particularly among adolescents. While a sizable body of literature has examined the nature,
prevalence, and correlates of worry in both adults and youth, laboratory investigations of this
variable using a real-time worry induction paradigm have previously only been done with adults.
The current study aimed to extend the literature by using the controlled laboratory methods well
established in the adult literature to experimentally examine worry and the validity of a worry
induction in a sample of adolescents. Specifically, 50 adolescents between the ages of 12 and 17
years were randomly assigned to either a worry or a neutral thought condition. Results provided
initial support for the validity of using an ideographic worry induction procedure with adolescents.
Specifically, consistent with hypotheses, participants in the worry group reported elevated levels of
worry, depression, negative affectivity, and muscle tension relative to the control group. Similarly,
repeated measures analyses indicated the manipulation produced increases in negatively valenced
mood and future-oriented thought among those in the worry condition. Unexpectedly, predictions
regarding the effects of the induction on happiness and degree of verbal-linguistic thoughts were
not supported and there was not evidence that the induction served as a semantic prime. Finally,
individual differences in metacognitive worry were not predictive of challenge response. Results
are discussed in terms of their convergence and divergence with the adult literature, relevant
developmental factors to consider, and future directions using experimental psychopathology
methodologies in order to better understand the phenomenology and consequences of worry
among youth.
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1
Worry Induction among Adolescents: A Laboratory Evaluation
Available research focused on the role of worry in the development of both psychological
(e.g., Generalized Anxiety Disorder [GAD]; Hoyer, Becker, & Roth, 2001) and physical (e.g.,
coronary heart disease; Kubzansky, Kawachi, Weiss, & Sparrow, 1998) problems indicates that
worry is an important process in need of further investigation, particularly among adolescents
(Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 2003). While a sizable literature has examined the nature,
prevalence, and correlates of worry in both adults and youth, laboratory investigations of this
variable using a real-time worry induction paradigm have only been done with adults. This is a
notable gap in the literature given the importance of experimental psychopathology laboratory
methods for better understanding and systematically examining psychological processes
(Zvolesnky, Lejuez, Stewart, & Curtin, 2001). In order to fully address the processes and
mechanisms of worry in youth it will be important to model this factor in a controlled laboratory
setting. The objective of the current study was therefore to experimentally examine the validity of
a worry induction in a sample of adolescents.
Worry: Nature and Prevalence
Worry is defined as a future-oriented cognitive process that is verbal-linguistic in nature (cf.,
imagery based) and involves repetitive thoughts related to negative future events, outcomes, and
consequences (Barlow, 1988; Vasey, Crnic, & Carter, 1994). The verbal-linguistic quality of
worry is a defining feature of this construct and may contribute to the unique
psychophysiological effects that characterize the state of worry. Specifically, theoretical accounts
of the verbal-linguistic nature of worry (Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996; Lyonfields,
Borkovec, & Thayer, 1995) are supported by self-report of verbal-linguistic mentations among
individuals while worrying (Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Freeston et al., 1996) and by increased frontal

2
cortical activation (Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998), which suppresses affect-related subcortical
regions (Hoehn-Saric, Lee, McLeod, & Wong, 2005). In other words, brain areas activated during
the state of worry are tied more closely to verbal-linguistic processing than to imagery-based
processing. These neuroimaging patterns are discernable among non-anxious participants (HoehnSaric et al., 2005) as well as high trait worriers (Schienle, Schäfer, Pignanelli, & Vaiti, 2009) and
change with psychopharmacologic intervention for individuals with GAD (Hoehn-Saric, Schlund,
& Wong, 2004). For example, fMRI data collected by Hoehn-Saric et al., (2005) from non-anxious
individuals indicated that worry activated the left inferior frontal gyrus which is an area associated
with language, and the orbitofrontal gyrus which is linked with decision making and integrating
information about the reinforcement value of stimuli. Furthermore, these authors reported a
negative correlation between the activation of the orbitofrontal gyrus and the activation of the
amygdala (the structure in the limbic system associated with emotion) suggesting that worry
inhibits the limbic system. The verbal-linguistic nature of worry is important because while the
precise etiological and maintenance factors involved in pathological worry are still unclear,
contemporary theoretical models suggest the verbal-linguistic quality of worry allows for the
rehearsal of feared outcomes and is associated high stable heart rate and low heart rate variability
(i.e., low vagal tone), which may allow the worried individual to remain at a consistent level of
anxiety (Llera & Newman, 2010, Newman & Llera, 2011). The avoidance of large mood
fluctuations in response to stressors, termed a “contrast effect” thereby negatively reinforces the
worry process. Indeed, there is a wealth of data indicating that worry, similar to other types of
anxious arousal results in both increased sympathetic arousal (e.g., heart rate; galvanic skin
responding; Hofmann et al., 2005; Lyonfields et al., 1995; Stapinski et al., 2010; Thayer,
Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996; York, Borkovec, Vasey, & Stern, 1987) and decreased vagal tone
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(Brosschot, 2010; Brosschot & Thayer, 2003; Hoehn-Saric, McLeod, Funderburk, & Kowalski,
2004; Lyonfields et al., 1995; Thayer et al., 1996).
Worry is conceptualized to exist on a dimension between normative and pathological (Olatunji,
Broman-Fulks, Bergman, Green, & Ziomke, 2010; Ruscio, Borkovec, & Ruscio, 2001); compared
to normative worry, pathological worry is more characteristically maladaptive, intrusive, excessive,
unrealistic and, most importantly, uncontrollable (Borkovec, Shadick, & Hopkins, 1991).
Normative and pathological worry can be distinguished in at least three important ways. First,
pathological worry is associated with increased meta-cognitions about worry (i.e., worry about
worry; Wells, 2005, Wells & Carter 1999, 2001). Meta-worry is linked to greater concerns about
the nature and consequences of worrying, believing for example, that worry is dangerous and
uncontrollable (Wells, 2005). Individuals high in meta-worry appear to be more sensitive to worry
and more likely to engage in pathological worry. Second, pathological worry often co-occurs with
characteristic psychophysiological symptoms, including restlessness, fatigue, irritability, muscle
tension, sleep, and concentration difficulties (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Third,
while normative worry is prevalent (i.e., more than two-thirds of children report worrying
occasionally about at least one topic; Orton, 1982; Silverman, La Greca, & Wasserstein, 1995),
pathological worry is relatively less common. Nonetheless, a substantial minority of adolescents
experience excessive and uncontrollable worry (e.g., 21%; Laugesen et al., 2003).
Pathological worry is the hallmark symptom of GAD, a psychological condition characterized
by excessive and uncontrollable worry (Olatunji, Wolitzky-Taylor, Sawchuk, & Ciesielski, 2011;
Tracey, Chorpita, Douban, & Barlow, 1997; Wells, 2005). Prospective data indicates full-blown
GAD, is rare among adolescents (1%; Canino et al., 2004), however, it increases in prevalence in
adulthood (5.7%; Kessler et al., 2005). Beyond GAD, pathological worry is considered a basic
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risk factor that cuts across a number of other psychological disorders (Albano & Hack, 2004;
APA, 2000), including panic disorder (Craske et al., 2010), obsessive-compulsive disorder
(Wells & Papageorigiou, 1998), hypochondriasis (Martin & Jacobi, 2006), depression (Olatunji,
Broman-Fulks, Bergman, Green, & Ziomke, 2010), eating disorders (Sassaroli, et al., 2005), and
various internalizing-type symptoms (Olatunji et al., 2010). For example, in a study of 1,220
undergraduate participants, Olatunji and colleagues evaluated worry from a taxometric
perspective. These authors found that worry is not taxonic but rather continuous in nature,
suggesting the full spectrum of worry is worthy of consideration in scientific investigation.
Furthermore, worry across the continuum was equally associated with anxiety, depression, and
stress. Collectively, these findings suggest that individuals likely vary along a continuum from
normative to pathological worry and that worry is a non-specific predictor of several clinically
relevant outcomes. Worry-related outcomes are discussed next as a means of situating the current
study within the broader literature and highlighting the necessity of identifying a valid means of
inducing worry among youth. When possible, work with children and adolescents is discussed,
although in some cases the youth literature lags considerably behind adult work.
Correlates and Consequences of Worry
In addition to specific psychological conditions, excessive and uncontrollable worry is linked
to a wide range of negative sequelae among youth, including lowered academic functioning,
impaired social relationships, higher frequency of school absenteeism (Albano & Hack, 2004), as
well as maladaptive problem-solving (Gosselin et al., 2007; Laugesen et al., 2003). For example,
in a study of 528 adolescents aged 14-18 years, Laugesen et al., (2003) found that worry related
positively to a negative problem-solving orientation, which reflects a lack self-efficacy in
problem solving and belief that problems are unsolvable. Laugesen and colleagues suggest that a
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negative problem-solving orientation may be particularly problematic during adolescence, a time
in which youth are confronted with increasingly frequent problems to which they need to devise
constructive solutions. Additionally, Gosselin et al. (2007) found, in a study of 777 adolescents
aged 12-19 years, that adolescents with high levels of worry had more avoidance strategies and
endorsed more erroneous beliefs about the usefulness of worry (e.g., worry helps prevent
negative events). Collectively, these data suggest worriers may be underprepared to effectively
resolve the developmental challenges inherent in adolescence.
Worry is also associated with health concerns (Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006;
Brosschot & Van Der Doef, 2006) such as an increased risk of heart disease, including
hypertension and an elevated likelihood of experiencing a fatal coronary event (Kubzansky et al.,
1998). For instance, Brosschot and Van Der Doef (2006) reported a positive correlation between
high trait worry and health complaints. Interestingly, these authors also found that such
complaints reduced after a brief worry intervention. Cardiac vagal tone, an indirect measure of
the parasympathetic nervous system, indexed with heart rate variability, is an established
outcome related to chronic worry (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Hammel et al., 2011; Pieper,
Brosschot, van der Leeden & Thayer, 2007; Verkuil, Brosschot, Borkovec, & Thayer, 2009) and
is a potential risk factor for sudden cardiac arrest even among people without coronary heart
disease (Ghuran et al., 2002). In addition, chronic worry is linked with decreased immune
functioning; the dampening effects of worry on the autonomic nervous system are thought to be
linked to lower immune responses through a reduction of lymphocyte functioning (La Via,
Workman, & Lydiard, 1992; La Via et al., 1996; Segerstrom, Glover, Craske, & Fahey, 1999).
For instance, Verkuil and colleagues (2009) assessed physiological outcomes (e.g., heart rate and
heart rate variability) in sample of 53 adults during period of worry, relaxation, or problem-
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solving in the laboratory. Their results indicated that negative cardiovascular effects were
enhanced during both the worry and problem-solving periods suggesting that the chronic high
cognitive load often associated with persistent worry may increase cardiovascular risk. The
research linking health relevant outcomes with worry in youth has been limited in part due to the
lack of a laboratory method for modeling the worry process in youth. Addressing this gap will
allow future researchers to replicate and extend the health literature in adults to youth samples.
As will be discussed next, late childhood and adolescence mark an important period in terms of
psychological vulnerability (Dahl, 2004; Paus, Keshavan, & Giedd, 2008), thus making the
systematic study of worry and its consequences imperative during these developmental stages.
Worry Across Development
The existing youth worry literature has relied almost exclusively on self-report
questionnaires (Gosselin et al., 2007; Laugesen et al., 2003; Muris, Roelofs, Meesters, &
Boomsma, 2004; Muris, Meesters, Merckelbach, & Hülsenbeck, 2000; Silverman et al., 1995;
Szabó, 2009). Published studies utilizing relatively more sophisticated approaches to the study of
worry among youth use methods such as presenting vignettes of anxious situations (Suarez & BellDolan, 2001; Vasey et al., 1994) and interviews (Turner & Wilson, 2010; Vasey et al., 1994;
Weems, Silverman, & La Greca, 2000) but few have utilized experimental procedures (e.g.,
random assignment; Turner & Wilson, 2010) and none have employed a laboratory induction of
worry commonplace in the adult literature (see Methodological Shortcomings of the Extant
Literature, below for a detailed discussion of worry induction among adults). Nonetheless,
available data speak to the phenomenology of worry among youth, which is an important backdrop
to the proposed study. Specifically, two lines of evidence are relevant; one focuses on the nature of
worry among children and adolescents, and the other relates to potential changes in worry across
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this developmental transition.
First, previous research using child samples (e.g., ages 6 – 16) has investigated content
domains (Szabó & Lovibond, 2004), number, frequency, and intensity (Weems et al., 2000) of
worry. In general, children worry more about physical threat or situations while the content of
adult worry is often more focused on social threats (Campbell & Rapee 1994; Henker, Whalen, &
O’Neil, 1995; Muris et al. 2000; Silverman et al.1995; Szabó, 2009.) For example, in a study of
119 clinically anxious youth aged 6-16 years Weems et al., (2000) found that Health, School,
Disasters, and Personal Harm were the most frequent domains of worry; these were similar to
topics reported in previous studies of non-clinical youth (Silverman et al., 1995), suggesting that
worry content does not distinguish pathological from normative worry. Instead, Weems et al.
(2000) found that that intensity and number of worries was most important in distinguishing
between pathological worry (i.e., worry in individuals with GAD) from non-pathological worry
(i.e., worry in individuals with specific phobia). Weems et al. (2000) found that these dimensions
of worry (e.g., intensity and number) predicted children’s level of fear above and beyond trait
anxiety providing initial evidence that pathological worry in children is conceptually distinct from
anxiety.
Second, extant theory, and to a lesser extent, data also indicate that the nature of worry
changes across time; current conceptual models highlight the transition from childhood to
adolescence as a particularly important epoch with regard to the nature of worry. While the content
of worry changes as adolescents emerge from childhood, a process likely driven by the context and
stressors specific to each developmental stage (e.g., specific fears vs. social fears; Vasey &
Daleiden, 1994), research suggests that this content shift may not be as important as an increasing
capacity for abstraction (Vasey, Crnic, & Carter, 1994). In a cross-sectional study examining worry

8
differences between younger children (i.e., 5-6 years old), mid-range children (i.e., 8-9 years old),
and older children (i.e., 11-12 years old) Vasey et al., (1994) found that age significantly predicted
degree of worry elaboration (i.e., longer and more varied worry sequences). More specifically,
cognitive development that characterizes this period is hypothesized to be an important factor in
worry (Szabó, 2009). Adolescents are moving into the period of formal operations (Case, 1987;
Piaget, 1970), thereby developing more elaborate and abstract reasoning skills as well as the ability
to mentally represent future events (Case, 1987; Fisher, 1985; Siegler, 1983, 1994). Given the
definition of worry as future-oriented (Barlow, 1988; Vasey et al., 1994), particular cognitive
competencies are necessary to successfully engage in the process of worry; one must be able to
think beyond what is observable, consider future scenarios, and elaborate on catastrophic
possibilities. Therefore, elaborative worry (i.e., the ability to imagine catastrophic consequences
and outcomes about future events) is likely intensified during this period of cognitive development
(Vasey et al., 1994). Consistent with this theoretical perspective, empirical work indicates that
worry correlates positively with age during adolescence (Barahmand, 2008) and prospective data
suggests pathological worry in particular increases during adolescence, especially among girls
(Hale, Raaijmakers, Muris, van Hoof, & Meeus, 2008). Similarly, Szabó (2009) found, among 42
adults, 62 younger children (aged 6-9 years), and 85 older children (aged 10-13 years), that older
youth evidenced worry patterns more similar to that of adults (evidenced by an increased
importance probability cost judgments in predicting worry).
Taken together, the worry literature examining developmental factors influencing worry
indicates that while the worry process in younger children may be distinct from that of adults,
“adult-like” worry comes on-line during the transition from childhood to adolescence, making this
a critical developmental period for the study of worry and associated outcomes. While promising,
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the extant literature is characterized by a number of significant shortcomings; these will be
discussed next.
Methodological Shortcomings of the Extant Literature
Despite the growing literature regarding the phenomenology of worry in youth and the
substantial literature about worry in adults, there are at least three limitations that characterize the
extant literature. First, data regarding the content, number, frequency, and intensity of youth worry
is limited by its exclusive reliance on retrospective self-report. Therefore, observed findings may
be due to inaccurate reports (memory bias) or affective biases. For example, research on mood
congruence suggests that individuals are more likely to remember events that have an affective
valance similar to the one they are currently experiencing (Egidi & Gerrig, 2009). Depressed
mood, for instance, is associated with both the recall of more negatively valenced information
(Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992) and more inaccurate information (Joormann, Teachman, &
Gotlib, 2009). Thus, our understanding of the nature and developmental trajectory of worry will be
more sophisticated if we can reduce the employment of methods that are particularly susceptible to
such biases (e.g., retrospective self-report).
Second, there is over two decades of research in the adult literature utilizing worry
induction as a sophisticated experimental approach to studying this risk factor (York, Borkovec,
Vasey, & Stern, 1987; Llera & Newman, 2010). In adult samples worry is typically induced by
gathering information about participants’ primary domains of worry and then providing
idiographic instructions to worry about the identified topics (Behar, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2005;
McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007; Thayer et al., 1996). This methodological approach has
yielded a wealth of information including physiological (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Oathes,
Bruce, & Nitschke, 2008; Thayer et al., 1996), psychological (McLaughlin et al., 2007)
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information processing (Oathes, Squillante, Ray & Nitschke, 2010), brain imaging (Hoehn-Saric et
al., 2005; Oathes et al., 2008), and health-related (Verkuil et al., 2009) outcome data which has
greatly enhanced our understanding of the nature and consequences of adult worry. However, the
study of psychopathology risk factors indicates that findings from the adult literature should not be
assumed to extend to youth (e.g., Cicchetti & Rogosch, 2002; Muris, 2006). Rather, consistent with
empirical principles that characterize the process of scientific investigation, better understanding of
the nature and consequences of worry among youth requires the study of youth. Furthermore,
childhood and adolescence is a “core risk phase” for anxiety related problems because risk factors
begin compounding and symptoms patterns begin to shift from mild symptoms to meeting full
clinical criteria. Indeed, evidence suggests that age of onset for most anxiety disorders is childhood
through late adolescence (Beesdo, Knappe, & Pine, 2009) suggesting that etiology research must
be conducted during this time of enhanced risk. Additionally, within the existing youth worry
literature there is comparatively little work with adolescent samples. It is important to extend the
growing adolescent worry literature because adolescence is a developmental period during which
mental-health risk factors, if not addressed, can persist and worsen in adulthood (Copeland,
Shanahan, Costello, & Angold, 2009; Ferdinand & Verhulst, 1995; Hofstra, Van Der Ende, &
Verhulst, 2001). Continued research on the nature of worry among youth will set the stage for
targeting worry-related risk and maintenance factors during this sensitive period.
Finally, it is notable that the absence of comparable child and adolescent worry induction data
make it difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding the developmental trajectory of worry. This
gap is both surprising and problematic given theoretical accounts regarding differences in the
phenomenology of worry across development (Muris, Merckelbach, & Luijten, 2002). By utilizing
a well-established worry induction procedure that is routinely employed in adult studies,
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researchers will be poised to directly compare worry-related outcomes across developmental stages
(e.g., linkage between meta-worry indices and sensitivity to worry inductions among adolescents
as compared to adults). Furthermore, a laboratory based method for inducing worry among youth
would allow researchers to assess psychosomatic outcomes linked to worry in adults (e.g., immune
response; Sergerstrom et al., 1999) which would permit the development of timely prevention
programs.
Experimental Psychopathology: Using Worry Induction to Better Understand Adolescent
Worry
Absent from the literature is a real-time laboratory assessment of worry among youth.
The validation of such an analogue procedure is consistent with experimental psychopathology
methods, which are defined as “identifying experimental psychopathology approaches of and
manipulating variables so as to induce essential features of psychopathology in a person…
without known psychopathology” (pp. 48, Olatunji, Leen-Feldner, Feldner, & Forsyth, 2007).
Experimental psychopathology approaches to worry have been widely used in adult populations
(Behar et al., 2005; Borkovec et al., 1998; McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007; Thayer et
al., 1996) but have not yet been validated with youth. An experimental psychopathology
approach aims to examine key features of a disorder such as etiology by “modeling” the
maladaptive behavior in a controlled laboratory setting. This paradigm allows for real-time
assessment of outcomes, which can reduce confounds such as retrospective recall bias
(Zvolensky et al., 2001). For example, using a sample of 60 adult participants, McLaughlin et al.,
(2007) examined the effects of worry and rumination. Participants were randomly assigned and
then instructed to either worry or ruminate using a standardized script. A repeated measures
design was used to assess the content of the participants’ mentation and mood throughout the
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induction, and depression, anxiety, relaxation, and negative affect ratings were collected
immediately following the negative mood induction (i.e., worry or rumination). This laboratory
based approach moves beyond existing data showing a correlation between worry and negative
outcomes (e.g., anxiety) by examining the real-time effects of worry.
The availability of a valid worry induction procedure for use with youth has at least two
other critical advantages. First, it will allow investigators to obtain a multimodal index of the
phenomenology and consequences of worry among youth. Thus, researchers could, for example,
address whether the parasympathetic activation observed in adults in a worry state is similar for
children and adolescents. Finally, the worry induction procedure lends itself to causally-oriented
hypothesis testing. For example in the adult literature, worry inductions have been used to
demonstrate that a high level of acute worry can interact with trait levels of worry, causing
interference in threat processing (Verkuil et al., 2009). This type of laboratory-based research has
resulted in an attentional retraining treatment shown to reduce trait worry (Hazen, Vasey, &
Schmidt, 2009).
Proposed Study: Conceptual Model and Hypotheses
Collectively, the available data highlight the negative consequences of worry and the
importance of having a sophisticated understanding of this construct among adolescents. However,
the majority of the worry research in youth focuses on identifying the content (e.g., Muris,
Merckelbach, Luijten, 2002; Vasey et al., 1994), frequency, intensity (Weems, Silverman, & La
Greca, 2000), and cognitive correlates (Gosselin et al., 2007; Laugesen et al., 2003) of worry.
While promising, this work is limited almost exclusively to retrospective self-report, and no work
has examined worry among adolescents using the worry induction procedures that are widespread
in adult work. The proposed study aimed to fill this gap in the literature by experimentally
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evaluating the validity of a worry induction paradigm in producing worry among adolescents.
Specifically, adolescents between the ages of 12 and 17 years were randomly assigned to either a
worry or a neutral thought condition, and the utility of the worry induction in terms of producing
the characteristic affective and cognitive correlates of worry was evaluated. Four specific
hypotheses guided the investigation.
First, following previous work, a main effect of condition was expected, such that
participants in the worry induction condition, relative to the neutral comparison condition, would
evidence elevated affective and physical reactivity to the laboratory task as evidenced by greater
increases in self-reported worried and depressed (Behar et al., 2005; Borkovec et al., 1998;
McLaughlin et al., 2007) affect, as well as generalized negative affectivity (McLaughlin et al.,
2007). Further, compared to those in the neutral condition, participants in the worry condition
were predicted to evidence increased self-reported muscle tension (Pluess, Conrad, & Wilhelm,
2009). As a test of divergent validity, it was expected that condition would not predict ratings of
happiness.
Second, consistent with previous adult research (Borkovec & Hu, 1990) as well as the
research and theory documenting the defining features of worry (Vasey et al., 1994), participants
in the worry condition compared to those in the neutral condition were expected to evidence
increased negatively valenced mood as well as verbal-linguistic and future-oriented mentations
across the induction period.
Third, consistent with the verbal-linguistic nature of worry, it was expected that the
worry condition would serve as a semantic prime. Therefore, in line with the adult information
processing literature (Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Oathes, Squillante, Ray,
& Nitschke, 2010) and theories about child information processing (Vasey & Daleiden, 1994),
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youth who had been semantically primed (i.e., worry condition) compared those assigned to the
neutral comparison group were predicted to evidence faster reactions times in a lexical decision
task for worry related verbal information (i.e., worry words) as compared to non worry related
information (i.e., neutral words). As observed in prior work (White, Ratcliff, Vasey, & McKoon,
2010), no differences for word accuracy were expected between word type or condition due to
the ceiling effects.
Finally, consistent with the metacognitive model of worry, which suggests that concerns
about the negative effects of worry predicts increased pathological worry (Wells, 2005; Wells &
Carter, 1999; 2001), it was predicted that metacognitive worry would relate positively to
elevated reactivity (i.e., ratings of worry and generalized negative affectivity) to the worry
induction.
Method
Participants
Fifty adolescents aged 12-17 years (26 girls; Mage = 14.98 years; SD = 1.73) were recruited
via flyers and advertising placed in the community. Descriptive data for the sample are presented
in Tables 1 (continuous variables) and 2 (categorical data). Reflecting the geographic locale, the
racial/ethnic status of youth in the sample was 86.0% Caucasian, 14% African American, and
4% Hispanic. All but one participant was enrolled in high school; the average grade level was 9th
grade. In terms of diagnostic status, 8.2% of participants met criteria for GAD and 14% met
criteria for MDD; while the number of GAD diagnoses was higher than expected, the frequency
of MDD diagnoses was similar to rates observed in prior work (e.g. 3.6% GAD; 13.6% MDD;
Kessler et al., in press).
Thirty-eight consenting parents/guardians were the biological mother, five the biological
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father, four the biological grandmother, two the adoptive mother, and one was a stepfather. As
can be seen in Table 2, there was variability in parent/guardian education, although most had
completed high school/obtained a GED or part of college. The age of the consenting parent/adult
ranged from 32-59 years with the average age being 42 years. The mean household of income of
participants in the study was $55,025 (range: $10,000- $200,000). Participants were screened for
current medication use that affects the central nervous system, cardiac system, or muscular-skeletal
system as well as evidence of limited mental competency and the inability to give informed,
voluntary, written assent to participate. No participants were screened out based on these criteria.
Measures
Pre-induction Psychological Assessment.
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule –Child version (ADIS-C; Silverman & Albano,
1996). Diagnoses of GAD and MDD were indexed via the widely used ADIS-C. The ADIS-C is
a semi-structured clinical interview developed for use with children and adolescents ages 8-17
years. The ADIS-C is commonly used in research and clinical settings to evaluate the major
anxiety, mood, and externalizing disorders as described by the DSM-IV (APA, 1994). The
ADIS-C is well-validated and evidences good test-retest reliability (Silverman, Saavedra, &
Pina, 2001; Wood, Piacentini, Bergman, McCracken, & Barrios, 2002).
Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children (PSWQ-C; Chorpita, Tracey, Brown,
Colica, & Barlow, 1997). The PSWQ-C is a 16-item measure that is used to assess trait worry
among children and adolescents. Participants use 5-point Likert type scale (0 = not true to 4 =
always true) to respond to questions such as “my worries really bother me.” The PSWQ-C
evidences a strong correlation with other measures of anxiety [e.g., Revised Children’s Manifest
Scale- Worry Subscale (RCMAS-worry; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978)] as well as acceptable
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internal consistency (∝ = .81-.90; Chorpita et al., 1997; (∝ =.91 in the present sample).
Meta-cognitions Questionnaire for Adolescents (MCQ-A; Cartwright-Hatton, Roberts,
Chitsabesan, Forthergill, & Harrington, 2004). The MCQ-A is a 30-item scale designed to
measure metacognitive beliefs among adolescents using five subscales relating to intrusive
thinking and worry (i.e., positive beliefs, uncontrollability and danger, cognitive confidence,
superstition, punishment and responsibility, and cognitive self-consciousness). Participants rate
statements such as “My worrying is bad for me” on a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = do not agree
to 4 = agree very much). The MCQ-A evidences adequate convergent validity [e.g., significant
positive correlation with the Revised Children’s Manifest Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds &
Richmond, 1978)], the Children’s Depression Inventory-Short Form (Kovacs, 1992) and the
Leyton Obsessional Inventory-Child Version (Berg, Whitaker, Davies, Flament, & Rapoport,
1988)] as well as acceptable internal consistency (∝ = .66-.88; Cartwright-Hatton et al., 2004; ∝
= .87 in the present sample).
Piagetian Cognitive Development Task. Previous research highlights the importance of
cognitive development in the ability to imagine and elaborate future possibilities as a necessary
component of worry (Vasey et al., 1994), and theorizes that concrete operational capacities are
necessary to engage in worry (Vasey et al., 1994; Muris et al., 2002). Cognitive development
was indexed directly in the current study rather than allowing age to serve as a proxy for
cognitive development. In other words, cognitive assessment was utilized to evaluate group
equivalence and to ensure that all participants had achieved at least some aspects of formal
operations (e.g., conservation of substance) to avoid any confounds that may be introduced by
including youth who, by virtue of their cognitive developmental stage, were unable to effectively
worry. Consistent with the anxiety and worry literature (Muris, et al., 2002; Muris, Mayer,
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Vermeulen, & Hiemstra, 2007) two Piagetian conservation tasks were administered to measure
participant’s concrete operational skills: (1) Conservation of liquid: the experimenter presented
two glasses of colored water (filled to the same level) and the participant was asked to confirm
that each glass has the same amount of water. Then the water from one glass was poured into a
tall skinny glass and the participant was asked if the glasses both contain the same amount of
liquid or if the contain different amounts of liquid; (2) Conservation of Area: the experimenter
presented two identical green surfaces and blocks were placed on each surface in identical
positions. The participant was asked to confirm that each surface has the same amount of space
remaining. Then the blocks were scattered and the participant was asked if each surface had the
same amount of space remaining or if they are different. Each task was scored as either 0 (failed)
if the participant reported that the property (water, green surface) was different or 1 (passed) if
the participant said the queried attributes remained the same. Participants were considered
passing concrete operations if they passed both conservations tasks. Tasks were counterbalanced
to reduce order effects.
Logical Reasoning Test (LRT; Allen, 1984). Select questions from Burney’s Logical
Reasoning Test were administered to provide an index of the degree to which participants had
achieved formal operations. This test was developed to determine a participant’s level of Piaget’s
cognitive development. Three syllogisms and three verbal analogies were selected from the
measure for use in the current study on the basis that the verbal reasoning would be more closely
tied to the verbal-linguistic nature of worry. Because previous research suggests that not all
participants in this age range would be classified as being in formal operations using this
measure (Allen, 1984), total scores were examined as a continuous variable to assess the degree
to which formal operations had been achieved. Each item was scored as either 1 (correct) or 0
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(incorrect) and then item scores were summed to create a total LRT score. See Appendix A for a
copy of the questions used in the current study.
Dependent Measures.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule for Children (PANAS-C; Joiner, Catanzaro, &
Laurent, 1996). The PANAS-C is a 20-item scale; participants rate each descriptor (e.g., sad,
frightened) on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = very slightly to 5 = extremely) to indicate the
degree to which the descriptor represents how they currently feel. The PANAS-C was originally
developed for use with youth ages 8-16 years (Joiner et al., 1996) but has been successfully used
with youth through age 18 years (Jacques & Mash, 2004; Laurent, Catanzaro, & Joiner, 2004).
The PANAS-C evidences adequate convergent validity [e.g., significant negative associations
with the Revised Children’s Manifest Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978)] as well as
acceptable internal consistency (∝ = .78-.81; Wilson, Gullone, & Moss, 1998; ∝ = .80 in the
present sample). Only the 10 questions comprising the negative affect scale (PANAS-CN) were
used in the current study.
Future-Oriented/Verbal-Linguistic Visual Analog Scale for Children (FOVLAS-C).
The FOVLAS-C was created from the measure described by McLaughlin et al. (2007) to assess
the content of mental activity during worry. Participants were provided a definition of verbal and
image based mental activity and then asked to evaluate the degree to which their current mental
activity was both verbal-linguistic and future-oriented using a 0-100 visual analog scale. See
Appendix B for a copy of this measure.
Self-Assessment-Manikin Scales (SAM; Lang, 1980). The SAM was used to evaluate
the valence of affective responding. Participants selected their current level of valence by
marking on or between one of five mood illustrations, yielding a 9-point rating for each scale.
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The SAM has adequate psychometric properties and is commonly used in research with youth
populations (Beidel, 1991; Greenbaum, Turner, Cook, & Melamed, 1990; Leen-Feldner,
Blumenthal, Babson, Bunaciu, & Feldner, 2008). Please see Appendix C for a copy of this
measure.
Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1958). Several SUD scales were used
to evaluate self-reported worry, depression, happiness, and muscle tension in response to the
laboratory procedures using a 0 (e.g., no worry) to 100 (e.g., very very much worry) scale. This is
a well-established measure of self-reported affective state and has been used successfully with
youth samples (Leen-Feldner, Zvolensky, Feldner, 2004; Leen-Feldner, Feldner, Tull, Roemer,
& Zvolensky, 2006). See Appendix D for a copy of this measure.
Lexical Decision Task. Participants were asked to decide whether a letter string (e.g.,
concern/ cruation) was a word or a non-word. Linguistic and developmental experts judged all
words as being at or below the 5th grade level (see Appendix E for a complete list of items).
Furthermore, a post-challenge assessment was given to a sub-group of participants to assess
word comprehension. For this task five of the most difficult words were chosen (i.e., reveal,
resemble, wisdom, dread, disturbed, and suspense) and participants were asked to indicate
whether they knew what that word meant. Only eight participants indicated that they did not
know what at least one word meant and overall participants did not know only 5.3% of words.
Following empirical precedent in the anxiety literature (Silvert, Delplanque, Bouwalerh,
Verpoort, & Sequeira, 2004; Stip, Lecours, Chertkow, Elie, & O’Connor, 1994), participants
completed 100 counterbalanced trials in which they saw 25 anxiety relevant word trials, 25
neutral word trials and 50 non-word trials. Because word length can affect lexical decision
latencies (Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006) this variable was controlled across stimuli. Worry words
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were selected by using synonyms of the word “worry” and also included threat relevant words
used by MacLeod and McLaughlin (1995). Neutral words were selected to match word length
and frequency of worry words from the list of non-threat words and were drawn from those used
by MacLeod and McLaughlin (1995) whenever possible. Non-words were also matched for
length. Subjects were instructed to press either the “j” key for ‘yes’ or the “f” key for ‘no’ to
indicate whether or not a letter string corresponded to a real word (these keys were also labeled
directly on the keyboard and above the screen to remind participants of instructions). They were
asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. A practice task with feedback was
administered prior to the mood induction to orient all participants to this procedure.
Procedure and Laboratory Tasks
Please refer to Appendix F for a graphical overview of the procedure and laboratory
tasks. Participants contacting the laboratory in response to study advertisements were informed
that the purpose of the study was to understand adolescent worry and the protocol was fully
described. A laboratory visit was scheduled for interested and eligible participants and their
parents or legal guardians. Upon arrival, adolescents provided written, informed assent and their
parents or guardians provided informed consent for child participation. Participants were
informed of the study procedures, risks and benefits, limits of confidentiality and that they could
withdraw at any time without penalty or prejudice. All participants were also provided with local
mental health referrals. No participants withdrew from the study.
Each participant completed one session lasting approximately one hour. Participants
began by completing a battery of self-report questionnaires in a quiet private space. The
questionnaire battery was randomized to control for order effects and a trained researcher was on
hand to address any questions. All participants were given a standard definition of worry drawn
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from the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for Children (ADIS-C) (i.e., “Worry is when you
keep thinking about things over and over and it’s hard to stop thinking about it. The things you
are thinking about are usually things that you feel nervous or afraid about.”; Silverman &
Albano, 1996, p.41). At this time, and consistent with empirical precedent (McLaughlin et al.,
2007), participants were asked to provide three topics about which they frequently worry (e.g.,
school, family) and three neutral topics (e.g., watching TV) for use during the mood induction
procedure. Participants then completed the cognitive development tasks.
After completing the developmental tasks, participants were randomly assigned to either
a worry induction condition or a neutral mood condition. The random assignment was not
completed until this point in the experimental protocol to ensure that the principal investigator
was blind to participant condition for as long as possible. Next, participants were seated in the
experimental room and given instructions specific to their condition, which included a 5-minute
baseline period, the 5-minute experimental mood induction (i.e., worry or neutral), and a 10minute post-induction recovery period. The experimenter left the room while the participant sat
quietly for the 5-minute baseline period, which has been successfully employed in laboratorybased anxiety research (e.g., Forsyth, Eifert, & Thompson, 1996; Leen-Feldner, Feldner,
Bernstein, McCormick & Zvolensky, 2005) to establish baseline levels of affect and cognitive
activity prior to induction (McLaughlin et al., 2007). At the end of this baseline period
participants provided baseline FOVLAS-C, SUDS, SAM, and PANAS-CN ratings. Then, the
experimenter guided the participant through one of two instructional sets (i.e., worry or neutral),
depending on the condition to which the participant had been randomly assigned.
Participants assigned to the worry induction condition were again reminded of the definition
of worry adapted from the ADIS-C and then a standardized, scripted instructional set adapted
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from McLaughlin (2007) which incorporated the idiographic worry topics identified by the
participant was read:
During this period, we would like you to create a worried state of emotion. Let’s review the
list of topics that you said you worry most about. You said you worry about _____ (most
worrisome topic) the most. When I ask you to begin, please close your eyes and worry about
_____(most worrisome topic) in the way you usually worry about it, but as very much as you
can, until I ask you to stop and to open your eyes. If you normally worry about only one topic at
a time, please try to do the same during this period. However, if your thoughts change to another
topic that you usually worry about during this period feel free to allow these thoughts to
continue. It is all right to change topics during this period if the changes usually happen when
you worry. (p. 27)
Participants assigned to the control condition used the three neutral topics they provided
previously and a standardized, scripted instructional set designed to match the worry condition
was administered:
During this period, we would like you to create a neutral state of emotion (not good or bad,
just in the middle). Let’s review the list of topics that you said are ordinary and do not result in
strong feelings. You said one of these things is _____ (previously listed neutral topic). When I
ask you to begin, please close your eyes and think about ______ (previously listed neutral topic)
in the way you usually think about it, but as very much as you can, until I ask you to stop and to
open your eyes. If you normally think about only one ordinary everyday topic at a time, please
try to do the same during this period. However, if your thoughts change to another neutral topic
that you usually think about during this period feel free to allow these thoughts to continue. It is
all right to change topics during this period if the changes usually happen when you think about
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ordinary things.
During the challenge procedures and consistent with the previous literature (McLaughlin et
al., 2007), participants were interrupted every 60 seconds and asked complete the FOVLAS-C
and SAM-valence scales. After each interruption, participants were instructed to close their eyes
and resume thinking about worrisome or neutral topics (e.g., please close your eyes continue to
worrying about ________ as you were prior to the interruption).
Directly following the challenge procedures, participants provided post-challenge SUDS
worry, depression, muscle tension, and happiness ratings, completed the PANAS-CN, and took
part the lexical decision task. Finally, after the post-induction tasks a positive mood induction
was administered to all participants to ensure that participants did not leave the laboratory in an
acute worried state. Specifically, participants watched a short segment from a Mr. Bean slapstick
comedy film clip. This induction has been previously validated with youth and used as a reliable
way to decrease ratings of anxiety (Hughes & Kendall, 2008). At the conclusion of the protocol,
participants were comprehensively debriefed regarding the conceptual and methodological
objectives of the study; any parent or adolescent questions regarding study participation were
also addressed at this time. Finally, adolescent participants were compensated $20 and parents
were compensated $5.
General Analytic Strategy
To ensure group equivalence (efficacy of random assignment), theoretically relevant parent
and adolescent variables were compared at baseline (please see Results for details about specific
variables). These variables would have been used as covariates in subsequent data analysis in the
unlikely event that the groups differed on these characteristics. In addition, pre-challenge scores
were co-varied in order to control for individual differences in baseline levels of each variable
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(e.g., worry; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) when using the corresponding post-challenge
measure as the dependent variable. Descriptive analyses (correlations for continuous variables;
group comparisons for categorical variables) were first undertaken to evaluate zero-order relations
among the primary independent and dependent variables.
Next, specific hypothesis tests were conducted. First, analyses of covariance were utilized
to test the hypotheses that subjects in the worry induction condition, compared to the control
condition, would endorse greater self-reported worry, depression, negative affectivity, and
muscle tension. Additionally, as a test of divergent validity, groups were not expected to differ in
happiness ratings.
Second, repeated measures ANOVAs were utilized to test the hypotheses that subjects in
the worry induction condition, compared to the control condition, would report increased
negatively valenced mood as well as verbal-linguistic and future-oriented mentations across the
challenge interval. Post-hoc analyses were planned to compare group differences at each
assessment time point and to compare within group differences at baseline and the post-induction
assessment.
Third, a 2 (worry versus neutral group) x 2 (worry versus non-worry words) repeatedmeasures ANOVA was used to compare group differences for response latency and accuracy in
information-processing task. More specifically, differences between worry and neutral words in
the lexical task were examined for each condition. It was expected that individuals who were
semantically primed (i.e., worry condition) compared those assigned to the neutral comparison
group would evidence faster reactions times in the lexical task for worry related verbal
information (i.e., worry words) than non worry related information (i.e., neutral words).
Consistent with prior work in the area (White et al., 2010), no differences for word accuracy
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were expected between word type or condition due to ceiling effects.
Finally, hierarchical multiple regression was utilized to test the hypothesis that meta-worry
will predict post-challenge challenge SUDS worry and negative affectivity. These outcome
variables were selected to limit the number of analyses conducted; in addition to SUDS worry,
which is central to the primary study objective, we reasoned that PANAS-CN scores reflected
changes in depressive affect and permitted an examination of generalized negative affectivity in
response to the challenge. Baseline SUDS worry or PANAS-CN, as appropriate, were entered at
Step 1 of the model. Main effects of condition and MCQ-A were entered at step 2. Finally, the
interaction between condition and MCQ-A scores was entered at step 3. This approach allowed for
an evaluation of the incremental predictive validity of the interaction term in predicting postchallenge responding. Main effect variables were mean centered prior to calculating the interaction
term.
Power Analysis
Given the absence of research examining a worry induction among youth, evidence was
gathered from self-report designs with youth and laboratory inductions of worry with adults to
inform sample size considerations.
McLaughlin et al., (2007) found in a sample of 60 participants that anxiety, depression,
and negative affect reliably increased following worry induction, evidencing a moderate effect
size for anxiety (η2 = .23) and depression (η2 = .33). Furthermore, a medium to large effect size
was found for the decrease in relaxation ratings (η2 = .49) in response to the mood induction.
These findings are especially important because the current study drew heavily from the
methodological approach of McLaughlin et al., (2007). Expectation of a medium effect size was
supported by similar studies (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2005). In addition, self-report data from
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adolescents suggests a medium effect size in terms of the linkage between worry and negative
affective outcomes (e.g., anxiety; Weems et al., 2000). Indeed, Weems et al. found in a crosssectional sample of 119 youth aged 6-16 years that number, frequency, and intensity of worry all
predicted anxiety with small- medium effect sizes (r = 0.20- 0.26).
Additionally, Oathes et al., (2010) found in a sample of 56 non-clinical adults that
participants evidenced a small-medium effect size (d = 0.15- 0.40) on an information-processing
task (i.e., dot probe task) with threat relevant words after completing a worry induction. Finally,
in a sample of 98 youth aged 7-17 years, Bacow, May, Brody, and Pincus (2010) found a
medium effect size for the association between meta-cognitions and anxiety (η2 = .08).
This literature provides at least two converging lines of evidence to inform decisions
regarding the current sample size. First, many of the sample sizes used in the previous related
studies (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2005; McLaughlin et al., 2007; Oathes et al., 2010) were relatively
small (i.e., < 60) and were still able to detect main effects. Second, given the moderate effects
obtained in both laboratory inductions among adults and relevant self-report data among youth,
the current sample size was based on an anticipated moderate effect size to ensure adequate
power to observe the main effects proposed in the primary hypotheses. Accordingly, power
analyses for the current study suggested a sample of 50 subjects with power of .80 and alpha at
.05.
Results
Theoretically, relevant parent (e.g., race, ethnicity, educational attainment, age, household
income, worry symptoms) and adolescent (e.g., age, race, ethnicity, cognitive development,
GAD/MDD diagnostic status, baseline levels of worry, depression, muscle tension, happiness,
verbal-linguistic and future-oriented thoughts) variables were examined across the worry and

27
neutral comparison groups to determine the efficacy of random assignment and whether any covariates should be used in subsequent analyses. Results indicated that groups did not differ on
any of these variables (see Tables 1 and 2). Descriptive statistics for each of the measures were
comparable to those previously reported in the literature (e.g., MCQ-A: M = 58.5, SD = 15.0;
Cartwright-Hatton et al., 2004; PANAS-C NA: M = 21.51, SD = 6.36; Joiner et al., 1996;
PSWQ-C: M = 15.44, SD = 7.38; Leen-Feldner et al., 2006). Correlations between continuous
variables are reported in Table 3.
Next, analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) were utilized to test the hypotheses that
subjects in the worry induction condition, compared to the control condition, would endorse
greater self-reported worry, depression, negative affect, and muscle tension in response to the
challenge procedures. Additionally, as a test of divergent validity, ratings of happiness were not
expected to differ across groups. Normality, homogeneity of variance, and linearity were
examined. It was determined that while the normality assumption had been violated, the sample
size of 50 was adequate to not “cause any major problems” (Pallant, 2007, p. 204). The
homogeneity of variance assumption was also violated but given the size of groups was equal the
ANCOVA is “reasonably robust to violations of this assumption” (Pallant, 2007, p. 204). The
linearity assumption was met. Data and inferential statistics are presented in Table 4. As
predicted, and after adjusting for baselines scores, participants assigned to the worry induction
reported higher worry, depression, muscle tension, and negative affectivity at the post-challenge
assessment compared to those in the neutral condition. Effect sizes were small to moderate (see
Table 4; Ferguson, 2009). Unexpectedly, there was a difference between groups in happiness
ratings, with participants in the experimental group evidencing significantly greater pre- to postchallenge changes in happiness compared to those in the worry condition. Specifically, both
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groups evidenced decreases in happiness and participants in the worry group (Mbaseline = 69.44;
Mpost-challenge = 47.54) were less happy after the challenge than were those in the neutral group
(Mbaseline = 71.13; M = 64.52).
Repeated measures analyses of variance were next conducted to assess the impact of
group assignment (worry, neutral) on participant report of mood valence as well as verballinguistic and future-orientation of mentation across 6 time points (pre-mood induction and after
each minute of the 5 minute induction). Planned independent samples t-tests were conducted to
assess group differences for dependent variables at each time point. A paired-samples t-test was
used when needed for within group comparisons between baseline and post-induction scores.
Means for each dependent variable at each time point are presented in Table 5. Sphericity, which
measures the extent to which the variance in each set of repeated measures scores is equal, was
checked for each analysis; Mauchly's Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of
sphericity had been violated in each of the three analyses presented below. However, as
recommended (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) the Greenhouse-Geisser and Huynh-Feldt corrections
were checked and neither changed the significance of results.
First, in terms of the effects of the worry induction on negatively valenced mood, the
hypothesis that the worry induction would increase negatively valenced mood was supported
with an interaction between time and condition (Wilks Lambda = .76, F (5,42) = 2.64, p < 0.05)
indicating the worry condition resulted in a significant increase in negatively valenced mood
compared to the neutral control condition. There was also a significant main effect of time
(Wilks Lambda = .58, F (5,42) = 6.00, p < 0.05) and group assignment (F (1, 46) = 12.78, p <
0.05). Polynomial within-subjects contrasts indicated that participants evidenced a significant
quadratic trend in their mood. As illustrated in Figure 1, the worry group evidenced a rapid

29
decline in mood followed by maintenance of this lower affect. Specific time point comparisons
(see Table 5) demonstrate that experimental groups were not significantly different at baseline
but were then significantly different in the hypothesized direction at each of the following five
time points. See Table 5 for a descriptive data and Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of these
data.
Second, in terms of the degree of verbal-linguistic activity across groups, recall that
participants were asked to rate how much of their thoughts were words, ranging from 0 to 100,
with 100 being “all words.” It was hypothesized that participants in the worry condition would
report their thoughts as being characterized by proportionally more words. The descriptive data
are consistent with this expectation, with participants assigned to the worry condition indicating
that the proportion of their thoughts described as words increased from M = 48.85 to M = 64.92
across the challenge interval. Indeed, compared to baseline the worry group evidenced
significantly greater verbal-lingusitic mentation at the post-induction assessment time point (t
(22) = -2.51, p < .05), suggesting that the worry induction did produce a significant increase in
verbal-linguistic thoughts. This comparison was not significant within the neutral mood group.
Analyses also revealed a main effect of time on verbal-linguistic thoughts (Wilks Lambda =
0.76, F (5,41) = 2.51, p = < .05), with a significant cubic pattern suggesting verbal-linguistic
thoughts increased at the beginning of the induction, followed by a plateau or moderate decrease,
followed by another increase in verbal-linguistic thoughts. See Figure 2 for a graphical depiction
of these results. However, there was no interaction between group assignment and time (Wilks
Lambda = 0.94, F (2,41) = 0.51, p >.05), nor was there a main effect for condition (F (1,45) =
1.50, p >.05). As can be seen in Table 5, between-group comparisons at each time point show no
significant difference between groups at any of the time points.
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Finally, for future-oriented thoughts, participants were asked to rate, from 0 to 100, the
degree to which their thoughts were future-oriented. Consistent with hypotheses, there was a
significant interaction between time and condition (Wilks Lambda = .74, F (5,41) = 2.94, p <
.05) indicating the worry induction increased the percentage of future-oriented thoughts
compared to the neutral control condition. There was a significant quadratic and cubic trend for
the interaction as can be seen in Figure 3. A comparison of the group means at each time point
revealed that the experimental groups were not different at baseline; however, they were
significantly different at each of the four time points during the induction. Surprisingly, future
oriented thoughts were not significantly different between the worry and neutral group at the
post-induction assessment point. There was no main effect of time on future-oriented thoughts
(Wilks Lambda = 0.86, F (5,41) = 1.29, p = >.05) but there was a main effect of group
assignment (F (1,45) = 9.95, p = < .01); see Table 5 for a descriptive data and Figure 3 for a plot
of the future-oriented data.
Next, a 2 (worry versus neutral group) x 2 (anxiety versus non-anxiety words) repeatedmeasures ANOVA was used to compare group differences in both reaction time and accuracy for
the information-processing task. To remove outliers, the means and standard deviations for each
participant were calculated and trials that were more than two standard deviations above or
below the subject’s mean were removed resulting in 11.3% of data being excluded (i.e., 565
trials). Additionally, in reaction time analyses, only correct responses were included, which
resulted in an additional 7.0% of data being excluded (i.e., 310 trials). Mauchly's test of
sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been violated for either the reaction
time or accuracy data. Real words were responded to significantly faster than non-words t (49) =
-5.77 p < .001. For reaction times, neither an interaction (Wilks’ Lambda = 1, F (1,48) = .25, p
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>.05) nor main effects were observed for either word type (Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F (1,48) =
1.19, p >.05) or condition [F (1,48) = 2.72, p >.05]; see Table 6 for descriptive data. These data
are in contrast to the hypothesis that the induction would serve as a sematic prime. In terms of
accuracy, no interaction was found between condition and word type suggesting that accuracy
was not significantly different between the worry and neutral groups (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.99, F
(1,48) = .29, p >.05). Results also revealed a main effect of word type for accuracy (Wilks’
Lambda = .84, F (1,48) = 9.20, p <.01) but not for condition (F (1,48) = .18, p >.05). More
specifically, participants responded significantly more accurately to anxiety words than nonanxiety words but there were no accuracy differences between conditions.
Finally, the effect of meta-worry on challenge responding was tested using multiple
regression. Results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 7. To limit the number of
analyses and protect against Type II error, the two broadest and most relevant outcome measures
were chosen for regression analyses. Prior to analysis, variables were mean centered to address
multicollinearity. Normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity were also examined. No violations
of normality or linearity were found, however, the homoscedasticty assumption for negative
affect was violated (Levene statistic (1,47) = 0.78 p <.05) which potentially weakened the results
with regard to negative affectivity. In terms of SUDS-worry, baseline level of worry was a
significant predictor and accounted for nearly 10% of the variance in post-induction worry. At
step two, both condition and MCQ-A scores predicted SUDS-worry, with participants in the
worry condition as well as those who were relatively higher in meta-worry evidencing greater
post-challenge worry (∆R2 = 0.37, p < .01). The interaction term was not significant. With regard
to negative affectivity, baseline level of negative affect was a significant predictor accounting for
nearly 20% of the variance. At step two, condition was a significant predictor, with individuals in

32
the worry group evidencing greater post-challenge negative affectivity. Meta-worry scores were
not significantly predictive of post-induction PANAS-CN scores, nor was the interaction
significant.
In light of the unexpected findings for total MCQ-A scores, it was reasoned that perhaps
a more fine-grained analysis was indicated. Specifically, the scale with the most conceptual
relevance to challenge response, Uncontrollability and Danger (UD) was examined in post hoc
analyses. The results of these analyses revealed no main effect of the UD scale or condition on
either post-challenge worry or PANAS-CN scores. Interaction terms were also non-significant.
Discussion
Research to date highlights the negative consequences of worry and emphasizes the need
for empirical study of the construct among adolescents. However, while a large experimental
literature has used worry induction procedures in adult populations, the youth worry literature
has been limited primarily to retrospective self-report focusing on the content, frequency,
intensity, and cognitive correlates of worry. The current study was designed to fill this gap in the
literature by experimentally testing the validity of a worry induction procedure in a community
sample of adolescents.
In terms of affective and physical reactivity to the worry induction, findings were
consistent with expectation, suggesting that the procedure produces greater self-reported worry,
depression, negative affect, and muscle-tension compared to the control group. Importantly,
these effects were significant after accounting for pre-experimental differences in each of these
variables. These data are consistent with theoretical accounts of worry indicating this state is
accompanied by increased negatively affectivity as well as muscle tension (Newman & Llera,
2011). Further, the data fit with findings from a wealth of previous adult research using worry
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induction paradigms (McLaughlin et al., 2007, Pluess, Conrad, & Wilhelm, 2009). Collectively,
these findings support the utility of the worry induction procedure in effectively eliciting a
“worried” state among youth, positioning researchers to utilize this approach in systematic
efforts to better understand the nature and consequences of worry among youth. As a test of
divergent validity it was predicted that happiness ratings would be similar across conditions, but
participants in the worry condition evidenced a greater decrease in happiness than those in the
neutral control condition. This finding is in contrast to adult data suggesting induced worry does
not diminish positive affect (McLaughlin et al. 2007). One reason for this discrepancy may be
that “happiness” is too narrow an exemplar of positive affectivity. For example, this construct
may have been understood by our adolescent participants to be the opposite of a general negative
feeling (which, as noted above, was increased by the worry induction) and thus rated themselves
as having a decrease in happiness. Indeed, previous research utilized the positive affect scale of
the PANAS to index rather than the single item (SUDS) employed in the current study. The
single-item approach was based on concerns regarding the effects of time on reactivity to the
challenge procedure (e.g., decay effects). Thus, it was reasoned that, in order to balance the
measurement of multiple post-challenge outcomes, positive affect should be indexed using a
single “happiness” item. An alternative to this explanation is that the process of worry does
indeed reduce positive affectivity among adolescents exposed to a worry induction compared to
those assigned to a neutral control condition. Such an interpretation would fit with extant work
supporting affective lability among adolescents (e.g., Arnett, 1999). A critical next step in future
research will be to utilize a more multi-faceted index of positive affectivity to clarify whether the
current observed findings are best explained by methodological and/or developmental factors.
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The set of findings suggesting the worry induction produced enhanced negative
affectivity is further bolstered by significant time, condition, and time by condition interaction
effects in terms of negative mood valence. These results suggest that the worry condition elicited
increasing negative affectivity across the worry induction interval and post-hoc analyses
indicated that participants in the worry group evidenced elevated negative mood at every
assessment point (except baseline). Figure 1 shows that this change (recall that the SAM is
reverse scored; so lower scores indicate elevated negative mood valence) occurs primarily in the
first two minutes of the challenge, after which participants evidenced stable, sustained negatively
valenced mood. These data complement findings discussed above and are consistent with the
adult literature (McLaughlin et al., 2007) providing additional evidence that the induction
procedure is effective in producing a negative affective state.
The second hypothesis focused on the nature of participant thought during the worry
induction. Specifically, this set of analyses focused on the degree to which participant thought,
among those assigned to the worry condition, was more future-oriented and verbal-linguistic in
nature as compared to those in the control group. First, in terms of future orientation, there was a
main effect of group assignment indicating that overall the worry group evidenced more futureoriented thoughts than the neutral comparison group. There was no main effect for time
suggesting that when collapsed across condition, participants did not evidence a significant
overall increase in future-oriented thoughts across the six assessment points Importantly, main
effects were qualified by significant time by condition interaction obtained for future-oriented
thoughts, suggesting the worry elicitation was effective in increasing the percentage of futureoriented thoughts among participants in the worry condition across the provocation interval.
This finding is important because while both worry and the conceptually related construct of
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rumination are characterized by repetitive thought (Segerstrom, Tsao,Alden, & Craske, 2000)
rumination is typified by past focused thoughts (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Papageorgiou and
Wells, 1999) while worry is more uniquely associated with future focused thoughts (McLaughlin
et al., 2007). Interestingly, comparisons of group differences at each time point revealed that
although there were significant differences at each of the four time points during the mood
induction, there was not a significant difference between the worry and neutral group at the postinduction assessment. This finding may be an experimental artifact of having intervening
assessments (e.g., SUDS) between the end of the mood manipulation and the assessment of
future-oriented thoughts which caused participants thoughts to become more present focused
(due to the need to fill out post-induction assessment measures). This methodological issue
requires further investigation (e.g., restricting the post-challenge interval). Overall, the current
data fit with the contention that the worry induction procedure utilized herein is effective in
producing specific worry-relevant mentation among youth.
This conclusion may be tempered, however, by the contrasting findings in terms of
verbal-linguistic mentation. Specifically, a main effect of time was observed for verbal-linguistic
mentations, suggesting increased verbal-linguistic thoughts among participants assigned to both
the worry and control conditions. There was neither a main effect of group, indicating when
averaged across time points participants in the worry group did not evidence a significantly
greater degree of verbal-linguistic mentation, nor was there a significant time by condition
interaction. However, when baseline and post-induction scores were compared within groups, the
worry group evidenced a significant increase in verbal-linguistic mentations while the neutral
control condition did not. This result is suggestive of the fact that the worry induction does
impact the nature of mentation, although the absence of group or interaction effects is surprising.
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It is noteworthy that the adult research literature typically compares mentation among
participants in a worry condition to mentation among participants assigned to other types of
mood inductions (e.g., rumination, McLaughlin et al., 2007; trauma, Behar, Zuelig, & Borkovec,
2005). Indeed, several studies report significant differences in the degree of verbal-linguistic
mentation between worry and rumination conditions but not between worry condition and a
neutral mood state (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Goldwin & Behar, 2011). The current comparison
to a neutral control condition rather than a different mood state may have weakened the expected
effect of worry on verbal-linguistic mentations. Indeed, it is plausible that the main effect of time
might be due to a general increase in verbal thoughts in response to the instructional set (e.g.,
close your eyes and think as much as you can) and the lack of between-group differences may be
a consequence of the fact that the verbal content elicited during an induced worried episode may
not be significantly greater than that produced by a neutral instructional set (where a mix of
verbal and imagery based thoughts may be expected). Such group differences may only be
discernable when worry episodes are compared to inductions of states theoretically and
empirically shown to increase imagery-based mentations (e.g., “pictures in your mind”;
McLaughlin et al., 2007). Future work could begin to address this empirical question by adding a
group to the current design, which would allow researchers to compare verbal-linguistic versus
imagery-based mentation among individuals exposed to a worry, neutral, and another affective
induction, such as rumination.
In terms of the third hypothesis, a lexical decision task was included in the current study
because a large adult literature supports an information processing bias associated with anxiety
generally and worry specifically (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mathews, Mogg, Kentish, &
Eysnck, 1995). Further, this effect demonstrates some specificity, having not been consistently
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associated with depressed affect (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Unexpectedly, the results of the
current study were inconsistent with this literature. Specifically, there was no main effect of
group (worry/neutral) or word (anxiety/non-anxiety) on response latency or accuracy, nor was
there an interaction effect of group and word on latency or accuracy. These non-significant
findings may be due to at least four factors. First, much of the existing information processing
research on anxiety has been done using clinical populations (see Mogg and Bradley, 2005 for a
review). Thus, the pattern of responding for a chronically worried adolescent with GAD may
differ from the acutely worried adolescent in the present study (Vasey, Dalgleish, & Silverman,
2003). Chronically pathologically worried individuals may experience more intense worry than
can be induced in a laboratory setting or the chronicity of their worry may allow for the
development of longstanding information processing biases that are not characteristic of acute
worry regardless of intensity. While research with clinical samples provides information linking
pathological levels of worry with information processing biases, it has not established a causal
link between worry and these biases. While it is possible that high levels of worry creates a bias
in how youth attend to the information in their environment, these quasi-experimental designs
with clinical populations also leave open the possibility that information processing biases are
epiphenomenal to the disorder itself. Additional research utilizing experimental
psychopathology methodology (e.g., worry inductions) that seek to compare clinical and nonclinical samples is needed in order to begin to establish a casual link between worry and
information processing biases and delineate the degree to which the presence of psychopathology
drives observed associations between these variables among youth. Second, there may be
developmental differences in the way adolescents respond to information processing tasks
compared adult to populations (Vasey et al., 2003). Vasey and colleagues (2003) suggest that
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information processing tasks may be especially sensitive to developmental differences across
childhood and adolescence because of the variation in the content of children’s worries across
development (e.g., young children worry more about physical threat while older children have
more social concerns; Vasey et al., 1994). Therefore it is possible that the anxiety relevant words
(e.g., danger, panic, accident; see Appendix E for a complete list of words) utilized in the present
study did not reflect the unique worries of the participants, thereby failing to produce the
expected effect. Future research would benefit from using an idiographic approach in which
words specific to participant’s identified worries are utilized during the lexical decision task.
Indeed, it would be particularly informative to compare lexical decision making using a
standardized word list (as in the present study) to an ideographic word list to replicate and
expand upon the current findings. Third, the lexical decision task was chosen for the current
study because of its relevance to attention biases that might be theoretically expected as a result
of an anxious lexical prime (i.e., worry induction) and was modeled after information processing
tasks used after worry inductions in the adult literature (Hirsch et al., 2011). However, there is
not a precedent for the use of a lexical decision task with adolescents; the youth information
processing literature has instead relied more heavily on the dot probe task (Dalgleish et al., 2003;
Oathes et al., 2010; Lonigan & Vasey, 2009) and the Stroop task (see Vasey & MacLeod, 2001,
for a review). Accordingly, it is difficult to determine the extent to which “methodological and
psychometric problems posed by development” (Vasey et al., 2003, p. 88) may have impacted
findings. More specifically, the reliability and validity of information processing task data may
be negatively affected by fatigue effects, difficulty in understanding or following task
instructions, and variability in vocabulary comprehension (see the Method section for
information about vocabulary comprehension in the current sample). These methodological
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factors may help to explain the current null effects. Future work could beneficially utilize
information processing tasks for which there is adequate psychometric data. Finally, it is possible
that the absence of findings in relation to the lexical decision task are due a “decay effect”
(Gendolla & Brinkmann, 2005). That is, the semantic priming effects dissipated during the
approximately three minute period between the end of the induction and the administration of the
lexical decision-making task. This interval was necessary to assess the other primary dependent
measures in the current study (e.g., SUDS). In addition, the lexical task itself took approximately
10 minutes to complete. This span of time exceeds typical post-induction recovery periods used
in worry inductions (~5min; Goldwin & Behar, in press; Hirsch et al., 2011). While the duration
of the “worry effect” produced by worry inductions has not been empirically investigated, other
negative mood induction procedures (e.g., Velten mood induction, Velten, 1968) evidence a
relatively brief duration (i.e., 6-12 min). Similarly, research using guided imagery to induce sad,
happy, or neutral moods suggests that mood can be reliably induced for a six-minute duration
(Sedikides, 1994). Collectively, it appears that researchers could conservatively constrain the
post-induction assessment interval to approximately six minutes and that the interval between the
worry induction and the lexical decision making task was potentially too long in the current
study. This recommendation however, is derived from research utilizing mood induction
generally, rather than worry induction specifically. Additional research is needed to empirically
establish the duration of the worry induction paradigm in both adults and adolescents (Brenner,
2000).
Finally, contrary to expectation, metacognitive worry was not related to reactivity to the
worry induction. Neither the total score nor the Uncontrollability and Danger subscale scores
evidenced significant relations with challenge response as a function of condition. Previous
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research supports a relationship between metacognitive worry and trait worry (Cartwright-Hatton
et al., 2004) and suggests that metacognitive worry distinguishes a GAD group from a nonanxious group (Wells, 2005). However, no work has examined the link between metacognitive
worry and laboratory induced worry. It is possible that the fundamental attributes of a worry
induction in a laboratory setting (e.g., time-limited, effortful) are in opposition to the
characteristics of metacognitive worry. For example, beliefs that worry is useful, worry is
uncontrollable and problematic, and one must avoid worrying (characteristics of metacognitive
worry) are arguably antithetical to the effortful worry requested by the researcher in a laboratory
setting. These important differences between laboratory induced and naturalistic worry may
account for the lack relation between metacognitive worry challenge responses among
participants exposed to the worry induction in the current study. Indeed, the metacognitive model
of worry (Wells, 1995; 1999) suggests that worry can be described in two basic stages. In the
first stage, which could arguably be described as normative worry, the individual engages in
worry about stressors in one’s life (e.g., financial matters, work responsibilities). In the second
stage, one begins to worry about worry (believing worry is harmful or out of control). The
metacognitive model proposes that this second stage of worry is what is pathogenic about the
worry process and leads to GAD. This second type of (metacognitive) worry would only be
expected to be present in a small percentage of a community-recruited sample. It will thus be
important to evaluate the association between metacognitive worry and reactivity to the worry
induction among pathological worriers. Indeed, in order to downward extend the existing adult
research and as suggested by previous researchers (Ellis & Hudson, 2010) research is needed
comparing the nature and consequences of worry using induction paradigms among youth with
GAD, other anxiety disorders, and non-clinical controls.
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In addition to the limitations of the current study noted above, a number of other issues
warrant addition consideration. First, the generalizability of the current study findings may be
constrained by the fact that the sample was predominantly Caucasian and participants received
monetary compensation for taking part in the investigation, which may have resulted in a selfselection bias. Future investigations would benefit from the use of more diverse recruitment and
compensation strategies. Second, some evidence (Vasey et al., 1994) suggests that worry may
evidence significant variability during this developmental epoch, however, the current sample
size prohibited fine-grained analyses of age effects or cognitive development on response to the
worry induction. Future research would benefit from using a cross-sequential design to examine
developmental changes in responding to a worry induction across the adolescent and young
adulthood period. Employment of sophisticated indices of cognitive stage (cf., age as proxy)
would further enhance the contribution of such a study. Third, psychophysiological reactivity
was not assessed in the current study. The adult literature suggests that a worry induction should
produce an array of physiological effects, including increased parasympathetic nervous system
activation marked by lower heart rate variability (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Hofman et al., 2005),
increased corticospinal motor response (Oathes, Bruce, & Nitschke, 2008), and changes in
regional cerebral blood flow (Hoehn-Saric, Lee, McLeod, & Wong, 2005). There are currently
no data that speak to the psychophysiological effects of worry induction among youth; this is a
promising avenue for future work.
These limitations notwithstanding, the present study provides initial evidence supporting
the validity of using a worry induction paradigm with adolescents. Specifically, such an
approach produced significantly greater self-reported negative affectivity, muscle tension, and
future-oriented mentation as compared to a control group. These data are promising and suggest
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that worry induction is likely a useful tool for examining the nature and correlates among youth.
This is an important contribution to the literature, as researchers can utilize a worry induction
procedure to rigorously and systematically evaluate the developmental course of worry, as well
as factors that may enhance or protect against the transition from normative to pathological
worry during the critical developmental phase of adolescence.
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PSWQ
Age
Household Income

35.09 (10.49)
42.12 (7.47)
55,025.00 (35,599.01)

Mtotal (SD)
36.6 (10.22)
40.2 (6.96)
56,328.00 (32,802.79)

Mworry (SD)
33.92 (10.96)
44.04 (7.61)
53,608.70 (39,109.10)

Mneutral (SD)
0.60
-1.86
0.26

t
ns
ns
ns

p

PSWQ-C
17.31 (9.24)
15.17 (8.76)
19.36 (9.39)
-1.62 ns
MCQ-A
55.92 (12.26)
53.12 (11.48)
58.72 (12.60)
-1.64 ns
Age
14.99 (1.73)
15.43 (1.77)
14.54 (1.61)
1.88
ns
Year in School
9.22 (1.74)
15.17 (8.76)
19.36 (9.39)
-1.62 ns
Logical Reasoning Test
2.98 (1.53)
2.88 (1.53)
3.08 (1.55)
-0.46 ns
Baseline PANAS-CN
17.51 (3.34)
16.84 (2.36)
18.21 (4.08)
-1.45 ns
Baseline FLOVAS-Word
45.19 (31.65)
48.75 (30.63)
41.63 (32.82)
0.78
ns
Baseline FLOVAS-Future
36.02 (29.70)
34.50 (30.63)
37.54 (29.23)
-0.35 ns
Baseline SUDS Worry
20.44 (19.04)
16.64 (17.30)
24.24 (20.28)
-1.43 ns
Baseline SUDS
7.56 (15.37)
6.24 (14.40)
8.88 (16.45)
-0.60 ns
Depression
Baseline SUDS Happy
70.27 (17.50)
69.44 (17.32)
71.13 (18.02)
-0.33 ns
Baseline SUDS Muscle
23.43 (21.85)
23.88 (23.13)
22.96 (20.94)
-0.15 ns
Tension
Baseline SAM
6.31 (1.19)
6.21 (1.14)
6.42 (1.25)
-0.60 ns
Note. MCQ-A: Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire-Adolescent (Cartwright-Hatton et al., 2004), PANAS-C: Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule for Children (Joiner et al., 1996); PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), PSWQ-C:
Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Children (Chorpita et al., 1997); SAM: Self-Assessment Manikin Scales (Lang, 1980); SUDS: Subjective
Units of Distress (Wolpe, 1958). SAM was reverse scored.

Child Variables

Parent Variables

Table 1
Descriptive Data for Continuous Variables

56

Child Variables

Parent Variables

Education (current level)

Gender

Parent Ethnicity

Parent Race

Parent Education

Table 2
Descriptive Data for Categorical Variables

Grade 6
Grade 7
Grade 8
Grade 9
Grade 10

Male
Female

Not Hispanic/Latino
Hispanic/Latino

White/Caucasian
African American

Grade 6 or less
Grades 7-12 w/o graduating
High school grad or GED
Part College
Graduated from 2yr College
Graduated from 4yr College
Graduate/Professional School
Completed Graduate/Professional
School

1 (2%)
11 (22%)
3 (12%)
8 (16%)
3 (12%)

24 (48%)
26 (52%)

49 (98%)
1 (2%)

1 (4%)
4 (16%)
4 (16%)
4 (16%)
4 (16%)

12 (48%)
13 (52%)

25 (100%)
0 (0%)

22 (88%)
3 (12%)

2 (8%)

3 (6%)

46 (92%)
4 (8%)

0 (0%)
1 (4%)
5 (20%)
6 (24%)
2 (8%)
4 (16%)
5 (20%)

Countworry
(%)

0 (0%)
3 (6%)
11 (22%)
11 (22%)
3 (6%)
11 (22%)
8 (16%)

Counttotal (%)

0 (0%)
7 (63.6%)
7 (14%)
4 (16%)
7 (14%)

12 (48%)
13 (52%)

24 (96%)
1 (4%)

46 (96%)
1 (4%)

1 (4%)

0 (0%)
2 (8%)
6 (24%)
5 (20%)
1 (4%)
7 (28%)
3 (12%)

Countneutral
(%)

2.50

0.00

1.02

1.09

2.50

X2

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

p
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9. Generalized Anxiety
Disorder

8. Major Depressive Disorder

7. Concrete Operations Test

6. Ethnicity

5. Race

Diagnosed
Not Diagnosed

Diagnosed
Not Diagnosed

Pass
Fail

Not Hispanic/Latino
Hispanic/Latino

White/Caucasian
African American

Grade 11
Grade 12
College

4 (8.2%)
45 (91.8%)

7 (14%)
43 (86%)

42 (84%)
8 (16%)

48 (96%)
2 (4%)

43 (86%)
7 (14%)

12 (24%)
3 (12%)
1 (2%)

3 (12%)
22 (88%)

5 (20%)
20 (80%)

20 (80%)
5 (20%)

25 (100%)
0 (0%)

21 (84%)
4 (16%)

8 (32%)
1 (4%)
1 (4%)

1 (4.2%)
23 (95.8%)

2 (8%)
23 (92%)

22 (88%)
3 (12%)

28 (92%)
2 (8%)

22 (88%)
3 (12%)

4 (16%)
2 (8%)
0 (0%)

1

1.5

0.6

2.08

0.17

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns
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-

1

2

-

-0.36

3

-

0.12

-0.18

4

-

0.09

0.14

0.40

5

-

0.56**

-0.07

0.34*

0.17

6

-

0.09

-0.13

-0.03

0.22

-0.21

7

-

0.89**

0.24

-0.05

-0.12

0.23

-0.11

8

9

10

11

0.30*
0.02

0.15
-

-

-

-0.11

0.29*

0.11

0.03

-0.05

0.32*

0.11

0.07

0.09

-0.26

-

0.22

0.18

0.29*

0.25

0.00

-0.04

0.27

0.23

0.15

0.51**

0.38**

-0.21

0.32*

-0.39

0.27

0.17

0.15

0.19

0.09

0.15

0.64**

12

13

0.38**

-

-

0.25

-0.03

0.32*

0.02

0.89

0.16

0.34*

0.38**

-0.03

.50**

0.03

0.29**

0.01

.46**

0.17

-0.29

-0.15

0.32*

0.52**

-0.11

0.17

0.31

14

15

0.03

-

-

0.25

0.15

0.05

0.03

0.14

-0.12

0.04

0.15

-0.09

0.02

-0.21

0.26

-0.10

-.40**

0.00

-0.13

-0.18

-.32*

-0.18

-0.24

-.30*

-.29*

-0.26

-0.01

-0.12

0.11

-

16

0.16

0.60**

-0.24

-0.23

0.02

-0.31

-0.27

-0.23

-0.30

-0.32

-0.25

-0.24

0.08

0.05

-0.31

Note. * = p <.05, ** = p < .01; MCQ-A: Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire-Adolescent (Cartwright-Hatton et al., 2004), PANAS-C: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule for Children (Joiner et al.,
1996); PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), PSWQ-C: Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Children (Chorpita et al., 1997); SAM: Self-Assessment
Manikin Scales (Lang, 1980); SUDS: Subjective Units of Distress (Wolpe, 1958). SAM was reverse scored.

16. Baseline SAM

15. Baseline SUDS
Muscle Tension

13. Baseline SUDS
Depression
14. Baseline SUDS
Happy

11. Baseline FLOVASFuture
12. Baseline SUDS
Worry

7. Year in School
8. Logical Reasoning
Test
9. Baseline PANASCN
10. Baseline FLOVASWord

6. Age

5. MCQ-A

4. PSWQ-C

3. Household Income

2. Parent Age

1. Parent PSWQ

Variable

Correlational Data for Continuous Predictor and Criterion Variables

Table 3
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Table 4
Condition Differences Controlling for Baseline Scores
Mworry (SD)
Mneutral (SD)
(df) F
p
η2
Baseline Scores
SUDS worry
16.64 (17.30)
24.24 (20.28)
SUDS
6.24 (14.40)
8.88 (16.46)
depression
SUDS muscle
23.88 (23.13)
22.96 (20.94)
tension
SUDS happiness
69.44 (17.32)
71.13 (18.02)
PANAS-CN
16.84 (2.36)
18.21 (4.08)
Post-Induction
Scores
SUDS worry
46.32 (29.10)
16.40 (25.07)
(1,49) 14.13
<.01
0.35
SUDS
10.84 (19.75)
3.76 (10.81)
(1,49) 6.89
<.05
0.13
depression
SUDS muscle
25.33 (25.77)
18.52 (21.36)
(1,47) 1.71
<.05
0.22
tension
SUDS happiness
47.54 (24.56)
64.52 (23.49)
(1,47) 5.98
<.05
0.12
PANAS-CN
23.00 (8.41)
17.80 (6.14)
(1,47) 12.86
<.01
0.22
Note: The effect of condition on post-induction scores was analyzed using the baseline score as a covariate; PANAS-C:
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule for Children (Joiner et al., 1996); SUDS: Subjective Units of Distress (Wolpe,
1958).
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Table 5
Means for Repeated Measures Analyses During Mood Induction
Mtotal (SD)
Mworry (SD)
Verbal-Linguistic
Baseline
45.19 (31.65)
48.75 (30.70)
Minute 1
54.92 (32.66)
58.24 (29.32)
Minute 2
56.82 (31.96)
60.16 (27.14)
Minute 3
52.98 (32.02)
59.64 (24.47)
Minute 4
53.96 (34.35)
58.20 (25.73)
Post-Challenge
56.65 (34.00)
64.92 (28.63)
Future-Oriented
Baseline
36.02 (29.66)
34.50 (30.63)
Minute 1
37.96 (32.07)
51.08 (30.78)
Minute 2
40.84 (32.96)
53.80 (30.96)
Minute 3
40.10 (33.57)
54.84 (28.75)
Minute 4
44.64 (34.32)
53.68 (30.78)
Post-Challenge
40.96 (38.72)
49.04 (37.16)
Negative Mood
Baseline
6.31 (1.19)
6.21 (1.14)
Minute 1
6.12 (2.99)
5.24 (1.09)
Minute 2
5.38 (1.64)
4.68 (1.57)
Minute 3
5.58 (1.67)
4.80 (1.53)
Minute 4
5.68 (1.77)
4.80 (1.76)
Post-Challenge
5.48 (1.88)
4.60 (1.73)
t (df)
.78 (46)
.72 (48)
.74 (48)
1.49 (48)
.87 (48)
1.70 (47)
-.35 (46)
3.14 (48)
3.00 (48)
3.43 (48)
1.91 (48)
1.45 (47)
-.60 (46)
-2.15 (48)
-3.31 (48)
-3.72 (48)
-4.04 (48)
-3.73 (48)

Mneutral (SD)
41.63 (32.82)
51.60 (35.98)
53.48 (36.41)
46.32 (37.45)
49.72 (41.34)
48.72 (37.33)
37.54 (29.23)
24.84 (28.16)
27.88 (30.16)
25.36 (31.95)
35.60 (35.87)
33.20 (39.33)
6.42 (1.25)
7.00 (3.94)
6.08 (1.41)
6.36 (1.44)
6.56 (1.29)
6.36 (1.60)

ns
<.05
<.01
<.01
<.01
<.01

ns
<.01
<.01
<.01
<.01
ns

ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns

p
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Anxiety Words
Non-Anxiety Words
Non-Words

891.82 (384.95)
903.46 (379.49)
1085.69 (480.00)

Mtotal (SD)
981.76 (465.26)
988.04 (465.02)
1149.20 (490.51)

Mworry (SD)
801.88 (263.11)
818.87 (250.76)
1022.19 (470.52)

Mneutral (SD)

Anxiety Words
0.96 (0.06)
0.96 (0.07)
0.96 (0.04)
Non-Anxiety Words
0.94 (0.07)
0.95 (0.08)
0.94 (0.07)
Non-Words
0.90 (0.10)
0.89 (0.13)
0.91 (0.06)
Note. Reaction times are reported in milliseconds. An accuracy score of 1 represents perfect accuracy while a score
of 0 indicates the participant did not select correctly on any trials.

Mean Accuracy

Mean Reaction Times

Table 6
Descriptive Data for Lexical Decision Task
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Table 7
Meta-Worry Predicting Change in Worry & Negative Affectivity
∆R2

t (each predictor)

β

sr2

p

Dependent Variable: Post-Challenge SUDS-Worry
Step 1

0.10

Baseline SUDS-Worry

< .05
2.27

Step 2

0.31

0.10

0.37

< .05
<.01

MCQ-A Scores

2.15

0.25

0.05

< .05

Condition

-5.55

-0.62

0.36

<.01

Step 3

0.02

MCQ-A Scores*Condition

ns
1.39

0.49

.02

ns

Dependent Variable: Negative Affectivity
Step 1

0.19

Baseline PANAS-CN
Step 2

< .01
3.26

0.43

0.19

0.23

< .01
< .01

MCQ-A Scores

1.92

0.26

0.05

ns

Condition

-3.92

-0.46

0.20

< .01

Step 3
MCQ-A Scores*Condition

0.02

ns
-0.13

-0.05

-0.02

ns

Note. Worry condition was coded “1” and neutral condition was coded “2”. MCQ-A: Meta-cognitions Questionnaire
for Adolescents (Cartwright-Hatton, Roberts, Chitsabesan, Forthergill, & Harrington, 2004). PANAS-CN: Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule for Children – Negative Affect Subscale (Joiner et al., 1996); SUDS: Subjective Units
of Distress (Wolpe, 1958).
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Figure 1. Negatively Valenced Mood Across Time as a Function of Group.
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Figure 2. Verbal-Linguistic Thoughts Across Time as a Function of Group
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Figure 3. Future Oriented Thoughts Across Time as a Function of Group
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Appendix A

Logical Reasoning Test
Questions 1-3 are called syllogisms. Each syllogism consists of two premises and a conclusion.
You are to determine whether each conclusion is valid or not.
Example:
P1: No one-year-old babies can walk.
P2: Paul is a one-year-old baby.
C: Paul cannot walk.
This is a valid conclusion.

1. P1: Not all R’s are T’s
P2: All T’s are M’s
___
C: Some R’s may not be M’s
(a) True
(b)False
2. P1: All coal is white
P2: All white coal produces red smoke when burning
___
C: Therefore when coal burns, the smoke is grey
(a) True
(b)False
3. P1: When John gets angry at Mary he hits her.
P2: John is not angry at Mary.
___
C: Therefore John will not hit Mary.
(a) True
(b)False
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Questions 4-8 are called verbal analogies. Verbal analogies consist of two pairs of words, each
pair having the same relationship. For example, in is to out as up is to down. The common
relationship between in-out and up-down is that they are opposites. Order of the pair of words is
also important. Although peel is to banana as paint is to house is correct, peel is to banana as
house is to paint in incorrect. In the following questions you are to choose two or three words
that will best complete each analogy.
Example:
a) tire
b) motor
c) highway
d) map

e)anchor
f) deck
g) captain
h) ocean

is to car as

is to ship

The correct answers are (c) highway and (h) ocean.
Highways is to car as ocean is to ship. A car operates on a highway and a ship operates on the
ocean.
4.
task is to

5.
a) music
b) house
c) bench
d) tuner

a)
b)
c)
d)

attempt
completion
work
question

as

e)problem
f) chemical
g) man
h) answer

is to piano as

is to solution

e) chair
f) leg
g) eat
h) furniture

is to table

6.
a) walk
b) toe
c) knee
d) foot

is to body as wheel is to

e) roll
f) machine
g) bicycle
h) spokes

Allen, J. L. (1984). Levels of cognitive development and attribution behavior relationships.
(Doctoral dissertation).

Please circle how much of your thoughts right now are about things that will happen in the FUTURE

All
Words

Not about
the future

Completely
about the future

0------------------------25------------------------50------------------------75------------------------100

No
Words

0------------------------25------------------------50------------------------75------------------------100

Please circle how much of your thoughts right now are WORDS that you are saying to yourself in your head

Future-Oriented/Verbal-Linguistic Visual Analog Scale for Children

Appendix B
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Lang, P. J. (1980). Behavioral treatment and bio-behavioral assessment: Computer applications. In J. B. Sidowski, J. H. Johnson, & T.
A. Williams (Eds.), Technology in mental health care delivery systems (pp. 119-137). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Please indicate on the picture below to represent your mood at this moment. You may mark in or between the boxes.

SAM

Appendix C
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Some

A lot

Very Very Much
Worry

Please rate your current level of depression by placing an X between 0 to 100 on the scale below

A little bit

A little bit

Some

A lot

Very Very Much
Depression

No
Happiness

A little bit

Some

A lot

Very Very Much
Happiness

0------------------------25------------------------50------------------------75------------------------100

Please rate your current level of happiness by placing an X between 0 to 100 on the scale below

No
Depression

0------------------------25------------------------50------------------------75------------------------100

No
Worry

0------------------------25------------------------50------------------------75------------------------100

Please rate your current level of worry by placing an X between 0 to 100 on the scale below

SUDS
(Wolpe, 1958)

Appendix D
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A little bit

Some

A lot

Wolpe, J. (1958). Psychotherapy by reciprocal inhibition. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

No
Muscle Tension

Very Very Much
Muscle Tension

0------------------------25------------------------50------------------------75------------------------100

Please rate your current level of muscle tension by placing an X between 0 to 100 on the scale below

Appendix D continued
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Appendix E
accident
alarm
anxiety
avoid
burden

concern
danger
disaster
distress
disturbed

Anxiety Words
doubt
dread
emergency
failure
fear

floating
grasp
harvest
brain
trading

wisdom
estimate
umbrella
resemble
stand

Neutral Words
scent
tradition
utility
host
greedy

atrobats
novic
cleerly
rapiw
bissuit
dappet
gloumi
loung
meeds
schmoogles

treaking
drescent
hemanded
plent
younj
sprunkles
inllude
nelarious
driggle
bridlet

Non-Words
felc
powors
oarliest
jokking
rougg
laghtly
resurcaced
crin
tobles
vubble

hazard
insecure
nervous
panic
problem

punishment
suspense
trouble
uneasy
worry

reminder
charity
fuzzy
through
adventures

whispers
suggest
soften
serve
reveal

elormity
profond
tubble
thunb
krescent
smish
vuctoro
andulate
infides
crescelt

wolls
ubrupt
amolish
houdes
pressang
fidedity
cruation
uppes
remmant
welme
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Appendix F

Recruitment from a
community population

Upon arrival, written informed
consent & assent obtained

Participants complete baseline
assessments

3 worry topics and 3 neutral
topics are obtained from each
participant

Participants Complete Cognitive
Development Task

5-Minute Baseline & Participants
Randomly Assigned

Worry Induction

Neutral Mood
Induction

Post Challenge Measures
& Information Processing
Task

Positive Mood Induction

Debriefed
&
Compensated $20
(Parent $5)

